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SYSTEMATIC REVIEW
Personal security alarms for the 
prevention of assaults against healthcare staff
Chloe Perkins1, Deirdre Beecher2, David Colas Aberg3, Phil Edwards1 and Nick Tilley3*
Abstract 
Background: Personal security alarms have been used to try to reduce violence against healthcare staff, some of 
whose members face relatively high risks of assault. This systematic review focused on the effect of alarms in reducing 
the incidence and/or severity of assaults.
Methods: Electronic databases, including Cochrane Library, Ovid MEDLINE(R); CINAHL Plus (EBSCO); PubMed; 
PsycINFO (OvidSP) PsycEXTRA; Applied Social Sciences Index and Abstracts (ProQuest) (1987 to current); Criminal 
Justice Abstracts (EBSCOhost); Psychology and Behavioural Science Collection (EBSCOhost); Social Policy and Practice 
(OvidSP) Sociological Abstracts; ProQuest theses and dissertations, were searched. Study designs eligible for inclusion 
were randomised controlled trials, interrupted time series and controlled before-after studies that assessed the impact 
of personal security alarms on assaults. Searches were undertaken for studies of healthcare staff in all settings (i.e. 
including staff working in confined spaces such as hospitals and also field personnel such as community health work-
ers). Workplace violence between colleagues (lateral violence and bullying) and other uses of personal alarms (e.g. fall 
alarms for the elderly, domestic violence prevention) were excluded. Search results were screened by title, abstracts 
and keywords for possible inclusion. Full text reports for all potentially relevant studies were obtained and indepen-
dently assessed for final inclusion. The primary outcome was physical assaults (recorded or self-reported). Secondary 
outcomes included increased confidence or self-efficacy in violence prevention (recorded or self-reported).
Main results: No studies were found that met all inclusion criteria. Four reported associations of personal alarms 
(and other variables) with risks of assault in healthcare settings. These were described narratively.
Conclusions: Healthcare workers in emergency departments, psychiatric units and geriatric facilities face much 
higher risks of assault than those in other healthcare settings. Alarm systems vary widely. Alarm systems form one of a 
range of measures, which may interact with one another, that are used to reduce the risks of assault. Given this com-
plexity and diversity, prior to field trials EMMIE orientated efficacy trials are recommended to try to establish whether 
alarms can be introduced and operated in ways that can contribute to reducing assaults in specific high-risk settings. 
In relation to findings relating to any given intervention, EMMIE refers to effects produced, mechanisms activated to 
produce the effects, moderators or contexts relevant to the activation of mechanisms, implementation issues that 
arise, and economic costs and benefits.
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Background
Violence against healthcare staff is a major problem. An 
international review found that a third of nurses have 
been assaulted and injured (Spector et al. 2014). In a 2010 
survey, between 5 and 8% of frontline National Health 
Service (NHS) staff reported being physically assaulted by 
patients or other service users in the previous 12 months 
(Ipsos MORI 2010). Such assaults against NHS staff have 
increased. According to NHS Protect figures, a total of 
70,555 physical assaults on NHS staff were reported in 
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the year 2015–2016 resulting in 1740 criminal sanctions; 
this represents an increase in total assaults of 4% from 
67,864 in the year 2014–2015 and an increase of 17% 
from a total of 60,385 in the year 2004–2005 (NHS Pro-
tect 2017a). Nurses are four times more likely to experi-
ence assaults than any other NHS worker, with student 
nurses and those in psychiatric and learning disability 
areas at highest risk (Wells and Bowers 2002). One quar-
ter of assaults are reported in acute wards and 69% in 
those for mental health problems and learning disability. 
Globally, nurses working in some departments face much 
higher levels of violence than those in others. The pro-
portions experiencing violence in geriatric wards (45.9%), 
emergency departments (49.5%), and psychiatric depart-
ments are substantially higher than those in a general 
sample of nurses (23.4%) (Spector et al. 2014). The source 
of these physical assaults against nurses have been found 
to be predominantly patients, accounting for 64%, with a 
further 30% being carried out by the family or friends of 
patients and the remaining 11% is lateral violence from 
nurses, physicians or staff (Spector et al. 2014).
The Crime Survey of England and Wales identifies 
occupational groups at most risk of violence. The 2014–
2015 Survey estimated that 1.3% of employed adults of 
working age had experienced one or more incident of 
violence at work over 12  months. It found workers in 
protective service occupations (e.g. police officers) to 
be at greatest risk with 9.2% experiencing one or more 
incident. Next came health and social care associate 
professionals, such as most nurses, of whom 6.1% suf-
fered one or more incident—over four times the overall 
rate (Health and Safety Executive 2017b). Those work-
ing in protective services and health have consistently 
been reported, over a number of years as being at high 
risk.
In 2000, the Home Office estimated the total average 
cost of each common assault at £540, which includes the 
physical and emotional impact, victim services, lost out-
put and the police court and prison costs (the average 
for more serious incidents of violence against the per-
son, excluding homicide, rising to £19,000) (Office 2017). 
Impacts of violence on staff include pain, time away from 
work, depression and low self-esteem; impacts on the 
NHS include loss of personnel for significant amounts of 
time and resignations (NHS 2003). Violence and abuse 
against staff present substantial costs to the NHS through 
additional staff training, security, staff absenteeism, poor 
staff retention, and legal fees. Direct financial costs of 
£69 million per annum have been attributed to physical 
and non-physical violence and aggression in the NHS 
(National Audit Office 2003). The cost of physical assaults 
during 2007–2008 was estimated at £60  million (NHS 
2007).
The high risk of assaults for NHS staff is suggested to 
be due to factors including: inadequate security, staff 
shortages, night-shift patterns, and the intensity of inter-
actions with patients (Oztunc 2006). Other contributory 
factors reported include: patient mental health, patients 
under the influence of alcohol or other drugs, waiting 
time and delays, problems understanding information, 
anxiety caused by practical issues (e.g. transport and 
parking), and an increase in expectations of standards of 
service which may not be met (Ipsos MORI 2010; Rew 
and Ferns 2005).
Interventions
Scoping literature searches revealed many studies that 
identified the problem of assaults against staff in the 
healthcare setting, and many studies that estimated the 
prevalence of such attacks and the exposure of healthcare 
staff to violence. However, there is a paucity of primary 
research into interventions to prevent violence. Interven-
tions to prevent violence against healthcare staff may be 
broadly classified as:
  • Environmental (e.g. staffing numbers; CCTV; fixed 
emergency alarms; personal security alarms; secu-
rity guards; police officers in A&E; making building 
access more secure for staff; ambient environments, 
proper lighting and calming décor; facilities for chil-
dren, e.g. play area);
  • Practices and policies (e.g. legislation such as the 
Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008; ‘zero tol-
erance’ approach policies);
  • Staff skills (e.g. NHS conflict resolution training; ver-
bal techniques; prevention and recognition strate-
gies; staff attitudes, knowledge and skills) (Anderson 
et al. 2010).
Key measures identified by NHS Protect to tackle vio-
lence in healthcare settings include (Business plan 2014): 
establishment of NHS Serious Incident Reporting System 
(SIRS) and Physical Assault Reporting System (PARS); 
conflict resolution training (NHS Protect 2013); use of 
the powers under the Criminal Justice and Immigra-
tion Act 2008 (CJIA) to tackle nuisance or disturbance 
behaviour (sections 119–120 make an offence of causing 
a nuisance or disturbance on NHS premises, and provide 
power of removal); and guidance on the prevention and 
management of challenging behaviours in NHS settings. 
A 2003 report from the National Audit Office identified 
a variety of security measures in place across NHS trusts; 
panic alarm systems (in 85% of trusts); closed-circuit 
television (CCTV) (in 92% trusts); security staff (40%); 
police presence (20%) and other measures (17%) includ-
ing restricted access, security screens in reception areas 
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and mobile phones for lone workers (National Audit 
Office 2003). Of the two most widely used security meas-
ures, CCTV has been reviewed previously (Farrington 
et al. 2007; Welsh and Farrington 2009) and considered as 
part of the What Works in Crime Reduction series (Col-
lege of Policing 2015), while the use of personal alarms, 
has received less attention. Personal alarms were there-
fore, selected for further study as the focus of this review.
The use of personal security alarms in healthcare settings
Personal security alarms are used across NHS trusts. A 
Health & Safety Commission report (Commission HaS 
1997) outlined three types of alarm system:
  • Panic button systems are part of an internal alert sys-
tem, which often comprise hardwired buttons placed 
in locations where there is a high risk of violence. 
Their activation triggers an alarm on a monitoring 
console. These may be useful in treatment and con-
sulting rooms, where their location is known only to 
members of staff (Commission HaS 1997). Clear pro-
cedures on when and by whom they should be acti-
vated should be set out and include a predetermined 
response plan. Portable panic attack devices may 
also be linked to an internal system providing similar 
locational alerts on a monitoring console.
  • Personal security alarms range from simple ‘shriek’ 
devices, designed to shock or disorientate an attacker 
to give victims time to get away, to a component in 
a monitored system (as above). Simple audible alarm 
devices are not based on the expectation that they 
will produce assistance from third parties. Rather, 
they are primarily intended to create a distraction to 
allow the worker time to get away from a potentially 
violent situation. NHS Protect also recommend that 
the personal alarms are discarded after activation to 
divert the assailant’s attention to silencing it (NHS 
Protect 2017b). Some experts advise personal audi-
ble alarms are more suitable for outdoor use due to 
the potential risk of escalating a situation indoors and 
their use now is more limited. It has been suggested 
that alarm systems that rely on the use of whistles or 
screams are ineffective and dangerous in in-patient 
or psychiatric settings and coded, silent alarms trig-
gering a response (as with a panic button) are more 
desirable in this setting. Personal security alarm or 
noise devices have been highly recommended for 
field personnel (e.g. community health workers) 
(Occupational Health & Safety Agency for Health-
care 2005).
  • Complex personal alarm systems include personal 
alarms linked to fixed detection systems e.g. by radio 
or infra-red. Components may include panic buttons 
(linked to switch board and/or police) and portable 
personal devices (linked to central system with loca-
tion information). Lone worker devices may also be 
included under this category.
Lone workers are a particular category of potentially at 
risk workers, prevalent in healthcare and other occupa-
tions, who work independently (often in a mobile capac-
ity such as community healthcare providers but also 
independently or alone within buildings) without close 
supervision (Health and Safety Executive definition). 
NHS Protect specifically defines lone working as:
“any situation of location in which someone works 
without a colleague nearby; or when someone is 
working out of sight or earshot of another colleague” 
(p5 NHS Protect 2017b)
Working alone is generally taken to increase a worker’s 
vulnerability, and the proportion of lone workers injured 
through physical assault is estimated to be 9% higher than 
for non lone workers (NHS Protect 2017b) and is thought 
to result in a greater severity of assault (NHS Protect 
2015). Lone worker devices or applications are covered 
by British Standard 8484:2016, a bench mark standard, 
which Lone Worker Devices must reach for certification 
and which forms the basis for a police response. Guid-
ance on lone workers and violence from the Health and 
Safety Executive, further reports the most popular equip-
ment used by lone workers to be:
  • Mobile phones or other communication devices, to 
call for help if needed and report their whereabouts 
and schedule to others, and
  • Personal alarms, which can help staff feel more con-
fident about their safety (Health and Safety Executive 
2017a).
Alarms are seldom the sole means by which attempts 
are made to prevent violence against staff in healthcare 
settings. The contexts in which alarms are used vary in 
terms of the other violence prevention methods in use, 
clinical specialism, whether lone working is a factor and 
population served. This review will draw together all 
studies that examine the use of any personal alarm inter-
ventions implemented to address the risks of violence 
and assault.
For this review we searched for studies in electronic 
databases and the grey literature primarily relevant to 
NHS or healthcare settings. However, to estimate the 
effectiveness of all categories of personal security alarms 
in healthcare settings, we broadened our searching to 
include evaluations in any other settings. We searched for 
studies in any settings which may include both mobile and 
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field personnel (e.g. paramedics and community health 
workers) and those working in confined spaces (e.g. hos-
pitals, mental health units, and GP surgeries) and did not 
restrict searches so that other high risk occupations could 
be included if relevant studies were found (such as trans-
port workers and lone workers). In practice, we found 
none in non-health occupational settings, which is why 
this review is confined to alarms in healthcare contexts.
EMMIE framework
This systematic review was conducted in support of 
the What Works Centre for Crime Reduction, hosted by 
the UK College of Policing. One aim of the UK College 
of Policing is to promote and facilitate evidence-based 
policing, defined as:
“a method of making decisions about ‘what works’ 
in policing: which practices and strategies accom-
plish police missions most cost-effectively” (Sherman 
2013) (p. 377).
Systematic reviews of the research literature lie at the 
heart of the ‘what works’ movement. The results of this 
review will be incorporated in an online toolkit devised 
by researchers at the UCL Jill Dando Institute of Security 
and Crime Science. To help structure the toolkit, the con-
sortium produced the ‘EMMIE’ framework for assessing 
five dimensions of evidence (Johnson et  al. 2015). The 
EMMIE acronym refers to:
  • Effect size (how effective is the intervention?).
  • Mechanism (how does the intervention work?).
  • Moderators (in which contexts does the intervention 
work?).
  • Implementation (what is needed to implement the 
intervention?).
  • Economics (how much might the intervention cost?).
These dimensions encapsulate the types of evidence 
studies might provide which could inform improved deci-
sion-making (Sidebottom et al. 2017) and were designed 
to give consideration to a broader range of issues, perti-
nent to crime prevention practitioners and policymak-
ers (Johnson et al. 2015). This approach to the systematic 
review in practice required a broader extraction of data, 
in addition to the more traditional estimates of effect, to 
uncover evidence across these dimensions and to reveal 
research and knowledge gaps in the primary studies and 
the evidence base.
Objectives
The systematic review was conducted to evaluate the evi-
dence underpinning the use of personal security alarms 
with the aim of reducing the incidence of assaults against 
healthcare and other high-risk staff. Were sufficient num-
bers of well-designed controlled evaluations identified, 
we intended to include estimates of the effects on the 
defined outcomes of interventions using personal secu-
rity alarms. We intended to describe: participant charac-
teristics, setting, recruitment methods, theoretical basis 
used in designing interventions, intervention implemen-
tation, delivery, and outcomes.
Information speaking to the EMMIE framework was 
extracted from the evaluation studies (Johnson et  al. 
2015). For each study we intended to describe the setting, 
theoretical basis for the intervention, characteristics, and 
outcomes. We planned to summarise costs of the pro-
grammes where economic data were available.
Methods
Criteria for considering studies
Broad search strategies were used in order to include 
evaluations of personal alarms in all settings that may 
be relevant to healthcare. Studies had to report on pro-
grammes where there had been controlled evaluation of 
personal alarms.
Types of studies
Experimental study designs were to provide evidence 
of effects, and included controlled-before-after studies, 
controlled interrupted time series, controlled trials and 
randomised controlled trials that assessed the impact of 
personal security alarms on measured outcomes.
Types of participants/populations
Inclusion criteria 
  • Primary populations of interest were healthcare staff 
in all settings (i.e. including staff working in confined 
spaces such as hospitals as well as field personnel 
such as community health workers);
  • Secondary populations of interest included work 
place violence in other settings with high risk of vio-
lence (such as some council departments, local hous-
ing association offices, or public transport providers).
Exclusion criteria 
  • Workplace violence between colleagues, lateral vio-
lence and bullying was excluded as 94% of physical 
assaults are carried out by patients, and family and 
friends of patients (64% by patients and 30% by fam-
ily and friends) (Spector et al. 2014). Further to this, 
it was anticipated that lateral violence may have dif-
ferent causal pathways and mechanisms.
Types of interventions
Personal security alarms (to include mobile and fixed panic 
buttons, monitored and passive personal alarms), exclud-
ing medical personal alarms (e.g. fall alarms for elderly).
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Types of outcome measures
Primary outcome measures The primary outcome vari-
able was a reduction in physical assaults (recorded or self-
reported), with studies of any duration included.
Secondary outcome measures The secondary out-
come variables included other recorded or self-reported 
measures such as non-physical assaults, staff pain, time 
away from work, depression and low self-esteem, feel-
ings of safety or insecurity, changes in working practices, 
increased confidence or self-efficacy in violence preven-
tion.
Other data We have extracted data from studies on 
mechanism, moderators, implementation and economics.
Search methods for identification of studies
Our search methods comprised four parts: first, we 
searched electronic bibliographic databases for published 
work (see below for electronic databases searched); sec-
ondly, we searched the grey literature for unpublished 
work; thirdly, we searched trials registers for ongoing and 
recently completed trials; finally, we screened reference 
lists of published studies. The sources searched were cho-
sen based on their coverage of the topic.
Electronic databases
In order to reduce publication and retrieval bias our 
search was not restricted by language, date or publica-
tion status. We searched the following databases between 
March and August 2016:
 1. Cochrane Library (to March 2016).
 2. CINAHL Plus (EBSCO) (1937 to 16/08/2016).
 3. Global Health (OvidSP) (1910 to 2016 Week 32, 
16/08/2016).
 4. ISI WOS: SCI-EXPANDED (1970) & CPCI-S (1990) 
(to 16/08/2016).
 5. Northern Light conference abstracts (2016 week 32, 
16/08/2016).
 6. Ovid MEDLINE(R), Ovid MEDLINE(R) In-Process 
& Other Non-Indexed Citations, Ovid MEDLINE(R) 
Daily and Ovid OLDMEDLINE(R) (1946 to 
16/08/2016).
 7. PROSPERO (to March 2016).
 8. PsycEXTRA (OvidSP) (1908 to March 2016).
 9. PsycINFO (OvidSP) (1806 to 16/08/2016).
 10. PubMed (Present to 18/08/2016).
 11. Social Policy and Practice (OvidSP) (to 16/08/2016).
 12. Applied Social Sciences Index and Abstracts (Pro-
Quest) (1987 to 16/08/2016).
 13. Criminal Justice Abstracts with Full Text (EBSCO-
host) (to 16/08/2016).
 14. ProQuest International bibliography of the social sci-
ences (1951 to 16/08/2016).
 15. ProQuest theses and dissertations (to 16/08/2016).
 16. ProQuest Sociological Abstracts (1952 to 
16/08/2016).
 17. National Criminal Justice Reference Service 
Abstracts Database ProQuest (to 16/08/2016).
Other sources
We searched the following websites and publications for 
additional reports and other grey literature to cover the 
same search period:
1. Open Grey (http://www.opengrey.eu/) (to March 2016).
2. Campbell Systematic Reviews (http://www.campbell-
collaboration.org/lib/?go=monograph) (to 16/08/2016).
3. NICE (National Institute for Health and Care Excel-
lence) (http://www.evidence.nhs.uk/) (to 16/08/2016).
4. TRIP (https://www.tripdatabase.com/index.html) (to 
March 2016).
5. Google Scholar (to August 2016).
We also performed internet searches, using the Google 
search engine, to trace grey literature and organisa-
tions related to prevention of violence to health service 
staff. The Ovid MEDLINE(R) search strategy in Appen-
dix 1 was adapted as necessary to search all other listed 
sources including the internet search. A specialist in 
criminology grey literature at Rutgers (Phyllis Schultze) 
conducted searches on our behalf. A collaborator at the 
College of Policing (Lynn O’Mahony) conducted further 
searches on our behalf of the National Police Library Cat-
alogue and POLKA (the Police Online Knowledge Area).
Data collection and analysis
Selection of studies
All studies identified through the search process were 
first exported to the EndNote bibliographic database 
in order to identify and remove duplicate records (this 
commonly occurs where the same record is found in 
more than one database). Once de-duplication had been 
carried out, the remaining records were imported into 
EPPI-Reviewer 4 software for screening and coding. This 
allowed the team to manage coding tasks, assess inter-
rater reliability, and share the results (within the consor-
tium and externally). Two review authors independently 
examined the titles, abstracts, and keywords of electronic 
records for eligibility according to the inclusion criteria. 
Results of this initial screening were cross-referenced 
between two review authors, and full-texts obtained 
for all potentially relevant reports of studies. Full-texts 
of potentially eligible studies went through a second-
ary screening by each reviewer for final inclusion in the 
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review, with disagreements resolved by discussion. Refer-
ence lists of all relevant studies were screened for further 
eligible studies.
Data extraction and management
Data were coded in EPPI Reviewer, and relevant data 
extracted using a standardised data coding set (Appendix 2).
Assessment of risk of bias in included studies
A review of quality assessment tools for non-randomised 
studies identified six tools that were considered to be 
useful for systematic reviews (Deeks et al. 2003). For this 
review, we intended to use a modified framework of one 
of these tools from the ‘Effective Public Health Practice 
Project’ (Thomas 2003). We intended to assess the meth-
odological quality of the study designs and describe each 
included study against the following criteria: allocation to 
intervention/control; confounders; blinding; data collec-
tion methods; attrition; fidelity; and follow up.
Data synthesis and analysis
Descriptive analysis We intended to describe all studies 
that met the inclusion criteria (see Appendix 2 for stand-
ardised data extraction sheet), including:
1. Study design.
Study design; quality.
Data collection methods, modes, and techniques; 
validity of tools.
Statistical and other analyses.
2. Participants.
Health care occupations.
High risk occupations.
3. Components of intervention.
Country, city.
Setting.
Theoretical basis used in programme design; postu-
lated mediators.
Inputs.
Comparator (if a controlled evaluation).
4. Outcomes.
Primary outcomes (e.g. reduction in physical 
assaults, recorded or self-reported).
Secondary outcomes (e.g. time away from work, 
non-physical assaults).
5. EMMIE framework.
Effects.
Mechanisms.
Moderators.
Implementation.
Economics.
Statistical analysis
Where estimates of effect were available, we intended 
to use statistical software (Stata version 14) to conduct 
a meta-analysis. If the included studies were sufficiently 
similar (i.e. comparable participants, interventions, and 
outcomes) we intended to pool the results using a fixed 
or random-effects meta-analysis, with standardised mean 
differences (SMDs) for continuous outcomes and odds 
ratios for binary outcomes, and calculate 95% confidence 
intervals for each outcome. The 95% confidence inter-
vals indicate a range within which we can be 95% certain 
that the true effect lies (Schünemann et al. 2011). A fixed 
effect meta-analysis would be used if it could be assumed 
that each study is estimating the same intervention effect 
(the true effect of intervention is fixed across studies) and 
that differences in the results are due to chance. A random-
effects meta-analysis would be used to pool effect esti-
mates across studies where they are assumed to vary and 
follow some distribution across studies. A random effects 
meta-analysis considers the different effect estimates as if 
they were random where there is lack of knowledge about 
why intervention effects differ between studies (Deeks et al. 
2011). Heterogeneity (variability) among the study effect 
estimates was to be assessed using a Chi squared test at 
a 5% significance level and the I-squared (I2) statistic, the 
percentage of between-study variability that is due to true 
differences between studies (heterogeneity) rather than 
due to sampling error. We planned to consider an I2 value 
greater than 50% to reflect substantial heterogeneity and 
use a random-effects meta-analysis if there was evidence of 
heterogeneity. We intended to conduct sensitivity analyses 
in order to investigate possible sources of heterogeneity due 
to study quality. Sensitivity analysis could include repetition 
of the meta-analysis substituting alternative decisions or 
subgroups (such as adequate vs. inadequate allocation con-
cealment; low vs. high attrition) to determine if the findings 
are robust in terms of the decision-making process of the 
meta-analysis used to generate them (Deeks et  al. 2011). 
In the absence of sufficient homogeneity, we planned to 
present tables of the quantitative results instead of pooling 
study results in a meta-analysis. Details of each programme 
were to be presented in a table of study characteristics.
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Results
Results of the search
Records from all searches were imported, screened and 
coded using the EPPI Reviewer 4 software. Initial screen-
ing was shared between three review authors (DB, DCA, 
CP), who screened the titles, abstracts and keywords of 
7922 records for potential eligibility according to the 
inclusion criteria. This screening resulted in the exclu-
sion of a total of 7710 records. The review authors iden-
tified a total of 212 records to be assessed for eligibility 
using the full text reports. After reviewing the full text of 
all potentially relevant studies, no studies were identified 
that met the inclusion criteria, the numbers of records 
excluded are shown in Fig. 1.
Expanding the review
Through the search process, four studies were identi-
fied that provided some evidence relating to violence 
and the use of personal security alarms. These stud-
ies did not meet the study design inclusion criteria but 
were considered to be the most relevant studies available. 
The full text reports for these four studies were coded in 
detail in EPPI Reviewer and are qualitatively described. 
The focus of the review then became to determine what 
might be inferred from the studies available and what 
research gaps remain regarding the use of personal 
alarms. Given the paucity of available studies assessing 
the effects of personal alarms, consideration is given to 
how further studies can be devised to aid policy makers 
and practitioners to decide if, when, where and how to 
implement the use of personal alarms to reduce violence.
Description of studies on personal alarm use
Four studies were identified which provided some meas-
ure of associations between personal alarm use and vio-
lence (Gale et al. 2002; Gerberich et al. 2005; Landau and 
Bendalak 2008; Farrell et  al. 2014). None was based in 
the UK, with one each in New Zealand, USA, Australia 
and Israel. All were based in healthcare settings, with 
two studies reporting on samples of registered nurses 
Fig. 1 Flow of studies
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(Gerberich et al. 2005; Farrell et al. 2014), one study con-
ducted on staff in psychiatric units (Gale et al. 2002) and 
a further on all personnel in emergency wards (Landau 
and Bendalak 2008). None of these evaluated the use of 
personal alarms in a controlled way, and of these stud-
ies, three used a cross sectional design (Gale et al. 2002; 
Farrell et  al. 2014; Landau and Bendalak 2008) with the 
remaining study (Gerberich et al. 2005) employing a sur-
vey with a nested case control study design. Response 
rates for these studies varied from low (30%; Farrell et al. 
2014) to high (78.5%; Landau and Bendalak 2008) with 
Gale et  al. (2002) and Gerberich et  al. (2005) reporting 
moderate response rates (55% and 66–68% respectively).
Gerberich et al. (2005) looked at the use of panic but-
tons and personal alarms but grouped the use of personal 
alarms with mobile telephones (distinguishing between 
whether this was owned by the employee or provided by 
the employer). Farrell et al. (2014) did not look individu-
ally at the use of personal alarms either, instead referring 
to the provision of ‘personal protective equipment’, which 
was not clearly defined but was said to include personal 
duress alarms. Gale et al. (2002) measured the use of both 
personal alarms (referred to as pocket alarms) and panic 
buttons, while Landau and Bendalak (2008) looked only 
at the availability of panic buttons to staff. Three of the 
four studies used self-reported experiences of violence, 
which risk recall and reporting bias (Gerberich et  al. 
2005; Farrell et al. 2014; Landau and Bendalak 2008). Far-
rell et  al. (2014), however, asked participants to report 
on their last four working weeks to reduce any impact of 
recall bias and Gerberich et al. (2005) focused on particu-
lar months in part to avoid recall problems. Gale et  al. 
(2002) used violent events reported to psychiatric unit 
managers as their measures of violence but noted that the 
reporting procedures for events varied between units and 
the use of managers may have led to reporting bias.
Gale, 2002
A study in New Zealand used a cross-sectional survey 
design to determine associations between a number of 
risk factors and preventative measures and experiences 
of violence. An anonymous postal survey was sent to the 
managers of all 219 psychiatric units in New Zealand 
and completed questionnaires were received from 119 
(response rate 55%). Questionnaires covered information 
on the unit, the number of reported cases of events over 
the last 12 months (outcomes included property damage, 
attempted assaults, physical attack, sexual harassment 
and stalking) and the provision of preventative measures 
(including staff training, use of hazard sheets, pocket 
alarms and panic buttons).
One hundred and eleven respondents reported the 
use of preventative measures. Of these 45% provided 
staff with personal alarms and 41% made panic buttons 
available to staff. Study authors compared unit rates for 
outcome measures to risk/preventative factors using 
the Mann–Whitney U test. They reported that the use 
of pocket alarms was associated with a higher level of 
attempted assault (p =  0.0001) and attack (p =  0.0001) 
and the use of panic buttons had no significant associa-
tion with risk of violence. However, the temporal order 
of alarm use and assault risk was not considered in the 
research.
Gerberich, 2005
An initial screening survey was undertaken of 6300 cur-
rently active nurses in Minnesota who had been work-
ing for at least 12 months, and were selected randomly 
from a 1998 licensing database (response rate 78%). A 
nested case control study was conducted using follow 
up questionnaires to a sub-set of respondents to evalu-
ate environmental exposures and physical assault. Four 
hundred and seventy-five cases were identified as nurses 
who reported at least one incident of physical assault 
within the preceding 12  months. Follow up questions 
enquired about conditions during the month when the 
assault took place (or for the first event if there had 
been multiple incidents). Responses were received for 
324 cases, a response rate of 68%. Controls were ran-
domly selected (1425) and also asked about conditions 
during researcher-specified months included in the 
study period before they reported any physical assaults. 
Responses were received from 946 control subjects, a 
response rate of 66%.
Multiple logistic regression was used to explore the 
relationship between exposures (including environmen-
tal and personal protection factors) and physical vio-
lence. Exposures were classified as follows:
  • General characteristics of staff and their duties—
included work experience (years licensed, years in 
department), average patient contact hours per shift, 
average number of nurses and staff in immediate 
work environment during most commonly worked 
shift; primary area/department worked; main patient 
population; primary activity;
  • Environmental design (features of the hospital envi-
ronment)—including lighting, accessibility of exits, 
physical barriers blocking vision;
  • Environmental protection (security features in the 
hospital environment for staff protection)—included 
the presence of video monitors, metal detectors, 
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security alarm/panic button, controlled access, secu-
rity personnel, or escort/body guard; and
  • Personal protection (individual protection factors)—
included whether or not staff had access to a cellular 
telephone or personal alarm (and whether this was 
their own or provided by employer) and whether 
staff carried personal protection.
This study reported:
a. That of environmental factors, when lighting was less 
bright than daylight odds of assault were doubled 
(fully adjusted OR 2.15; 95% CI 1.58–2.83);
b. That the presence of a security alarm or panic but-
ton (vs none) was associated with increased risk of 
assault (fully adjusted OR 1.56; 95% CI 0.96–2.39); 
and
c. That risk was substantially lower among nurses who 
provided their own cellular telephones or portable 
alarms (fully adjusted OR 0.30; 95% CI 0.15–0.71) but 
that if these were provided by the employer that there 
was no difference (fully adjusted OR 1.01; 95% CI 
0.70–1.54). Authors suggested the reduced risk was 
not due to the availability of the alarm or telephone.
The study also reported the nurses were at greatest risk 
when working in nursing home/long-term care/rehabili-
tation; emergency departments; and psychiatric/behav-
ioural departments. These findings accord with those 
reported earlier in this review.
Farrell, 2014
Questionnaires were sent to a random sample of 5000 
registered nurses and midwives in Victoria, Australia to 
explore their experiences of patient and visitor assault 
(PVA). The response rate was 30%. The survey asked 
respondents about their experience of any kind of assault 
(including verbal, physical and threat of harm) in the pre-
vious 4 weeks, the presence of ‘protective’ factors in the 
workplace and their importance in managing workplace 
violence. 36% of respondents reported that they had 
experienced a patient or visitor assault (PVA) in the pre-
vious 4 weeks, which included verbal abuse (90% of vic-
tims), physical abuse (45% of victims) and threat of harm 
(27% of victims). Of these respondents, 46% reported 
repeat victimization (with three or more instances of 
PVA) with patients being responsible for around two and 
a half times more incidents of PVA than visitors were.
Binary logistic regression analysis was undertaken to 
identify any association between covariates and outcome 
(PVA). The reported results found a number of ‘protec-
tive factors’ against PVA. These included:
  • A high standard of patient facilities (to reduce fears, 
frustration and anxiety; adjusted OR 0.63; 95% CI 
0.48–0.84),
  • The provision of personal protective equipment 
such as mobile phones and personal duress alarms 
(adjusted OR 0.73; 95% CI 0.56–0.97),
  • Sufficient staffing levels (adjusted OR 0.70; 95% CI 
0.52–0.92), and
  • Effective policy enforcement by management 
(adjusted OR 0.56; 95% CI 0.43–0.74).
As found in Gerberich et  al. (2005) and previously 
noted in this review, the healthcare setting was also 
found to be critical to PVA occurrence. Farrell et  al. 
(2014) reported that personnel in accident and emer-
gency (Adjusted OR 4.27; 95% CI 2.47–7.39), aged care 
(adjusted OR 3.33; 95% CI 2.22–5.00) and psychiatric or 
mental health departments (adjusted OR 4.09; 95% CI 
2.41–6.95) were significantly more likely to be assaulted 
in comparison to other settings. Staff shift patterns were 
also reported to impact on the likelihood of PVA, with 
higher risk of PVA being attributed to those on rotating 
rosters compared to non-rotation (adjusted OR 2.15; 95% 
CI 1.58–2.92) and night duty when compared to day duty 
(adjusted OR 1.86; 95% CI 1.25–2.78).
Landau, 2008
Three thousand self-report questionnaires were dis-
tributed in the emergency wards of Israel’s 25 general 
hospitals to all personnel (to permanent medical and 
nonmedical staff, and staff from other wards attending 
patients in the emergency wards at the time of ques-
tionnaire distribution). The response rate was 78.5% 
(2356 completed questionnaires). A General Exposure 
to Violence Index (GEVI) was devised, based on par-
ticipants’ reports of exposure to violence in the pre-
ceding 12  months. A multiple regression model was 
used to explain the GEVI, using 15 independent vari-
ables, including professional characteristics (e.g. average 
weekly hours, position, length of time in department, 
participation in violence training workshops), personal 
characteristics (e.g. country of origin, gender, age) and 
hospital features (e.g. size and availability of an emer-
gency button).
This study used routine activity theory (Cohen and 
Felson 1979; Felson et  al. 2016) (RAT) as its theoreti-
cal framework. RAT’s starting point is that for a crime 
to occur a ‘suitable target’ (in this case a healthcare staff 
member), a ‘motivated offender’ (such as an angry, frus-
trated or mentally unbalanced patient or visitor) and 
absence of a ‘capable guardian’ (one source of which 
might be an alarm system) must converge in time and 
Page 10 of 19Perkins et al. Crime Sci  (2017) 6:11 
Ta
b
le
 1
 S
u
m
m
ar
y 
o
f e
ff
ec
ts
 in
 s
tu
d
ie
s 
fo
u
n
d
St
ud
y
D
es
ig
n
D
ev
ic
e
O
ut
co
m
e
Re
p
or
te
d
 m
ea
su
re
A
ss
oc
ia
ti
on
G
al
e 
et
 a
l. 
(2
00
2)
C
ro
ss
 s
ec
tio
na
l s
ur
ve
y 
of
 
m
an
ag
er
s 
of
 p
sy
ch
ia
tr
ic
 u
ni
ts
 
in
 N
Z
Po
ck
et
 a
la
rm
s
U
ni
t r
ep
or
te
d 
ph
ys
ic
al
 a
ss
au
lts
 
(p
ro
pe
rt
y 
da
m
ag
e,
 a
tt
em
pt
ed
 
as
sa
ul
t, 
se
xu
al
 h
ar
as
sm
en
t, 
st
al
ki
ng
)
U
ni
t r
at
es
 o
f r
is
k 
fa
ct
or
s 
co
m
-
pa
re
d 
us
in
g 
M
an
n–
W
hi
tn
ey
 
U
 te
st
A
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
ith
 in
cr
ea
se
d 
ris
k 
of
 
as
sa
ul
t (
p 
= 
0.
00
01
)
Pa
ni
c 
bu
tt
on
s
N
o 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 a
ss
oc
ia
tio
n 
w
ith
 
ris
k 
of
 v
io
le
nc
e
G
er
be
ric
h 
et
 a
l. 
(2
00
5)
N
es
te
d 
ca
se
 c
on
tr
ol
 s
tu
dy
, s
ur
-
ve
y 
of
 M
in
ne
so
ta
 N
ur
se
s
Se
cu
rit
y 
al
ar
m
/p
an
ic
 b
ut
to
n
Se
lf-
re
po
rt
ed
 p
hy
si
ca
l a
nd
 
no
np
hy
si
ca
l v
io
le
nc
e 
ev
en
ts
 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
st
ud
y 
pe
rio
d
A
dj
us
te
d 
od
ds
 ra
tio
 a
nd
 9
5%
 C
I
1.
56
 (0
.9
6–
2.
39
)
U
se
r o
w
ne
d 
m
ob
ile
 te
le
ph
on
e/
pe
rs
on
al
 a
la
rm
0.
30
 (0
.1
5–
0.
71
)
Em
pl
oy
er
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
m
ob
ile
 
te
le
ph
on
e/
pe
rs
on
al
 a
la
rm
1.
01
 (0
.7
0–
1.
54
)
Fa
rr
el
l e
t a
l. 
(2
01
4)
Su
rv
ey
 o
f n
ur
se
s 
an
d 
m
id
w
iv
es
 
in
 V
ic
to
ria
, A
U
Pr
ov
is
io
n 
of
 p
er
so
na
l p
ro
te
ct
iv
e 
eq
ui
pm
en
t (
su
ch
 a
s 
m
ob
ile
 
ph
on
es
 a
nd
 p
er
so
na
l d
ur
es
s 
al
ar
m
s)
O
cc
ur
re
nc
e 
of
 p
at
ie
nt
 a
nd
 
vi
si
to
r a
ss
au
lt,
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
se
lf-
re
po
rt
ed
 e
xp
er
ie
nc
es
 o
f P
VA
 
ov
er
 m
os
t r
ec
en
t 4
 w
or
ki
ng
 
w
ee
ks
A
dj
us
te
d 
od
ds
 ra
tio
 a
nd
 9
5%
 C
I
0.
73
 (0
.5
6–
0.
97
)
La
nd
au
 a
nd
 B
en
da
la
k 
(2
00
8)
Su
rv
ey
 o
f p
er
so
nn
el
 in
 E
D
s 
in
 
Is
ra
el
A
cc
es
s 
to
 a
n 
em
er
ge
nc
y 
bu
tt
on
 
(g
ua
rd
in
g)
G
en
er
al
 E
xp
os
ur
e 
to
 V
io
le
nc
e 
In
de
x 
(G
EV
I) 
ba
se
d 
on
 s
el
f 
re
po
rt
ed
 ty
pe
 a
nd
 fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
of
 v
ic
tim
is
at
io
n 
to
 v
io
le
nc
e 
du
rin
g 
pr
ec
ed
in
g 
ye
ar
M
ul
tip
le
 re
gr
es
si
on
 a
na
ly
si
s
C
lo
se
 to
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t e
ffe
ct
 
(p
 =
 0
.0
78
) o
n 
re
sp
on
de
nt
s 
ex
po
su
re
 to
 v
io
le
nc
e.
 U
na
va
il-
ab
ili
ty
 re
la
te
d 
to
 h
ig
he
r r
is
k 
of
 
vi
ct
im
is
at
io
n
Page 11 of 19Perkins et al. Crime Sci  (2017) 6:11 
space. If alarms are an effective source of guardianship 
the likelihood of victimization will be higher for those 
without access to an emergency button as a protective 
device.
The lack of availability of an emergency button was 
related to an almost statistically significant higher risk of 
victimization (p = 0.078). “Respondents without an emer-
gency button, tended to be more victimized” (referring to 
the GEVI, based on self reported type and frequency of 
victimisation to violence in the preceding year).
Discussion
In the discussion, information has been drawn together 
from the available studies that have been highlighted in 
the results section, and additional evidence gathered and 
synthesised (from sources including further relevant lit-
erature and expert opinion, see Appendix 4) to speak 
to the EMMIE framework, on the effects, mechanisms, 
moderators, implementation and economics of personal 
alarm use.
Effects
It seems apparent that none of the studies found are 
able to provide clear measurements of effect of personal 
alarms on assaults against healthcare staff (see Appendix 
3: Characteristics of studies; Table 1: Summary of effects). 
At best, these studies provide some evidence of asso-
ciation; however the direction of this association differs 
between studies. One study (Gale et al. 2002) found that 
the use of pocket alarms was associated with an increased 
risk of assault (p = 0.0001), while there was no significant 
association between panic alarms and risk of violence. 
Conversely, three studies (Gerberich et  al. 2005; Farrell 
et al. 2014; Landau and Bendalak 2008) report that the use 
of personal protective equipment (mobile phone or per-
sonal alarm) and access to an emergency button may be 
associated with some decreased risk of assault. However, 
Gerberich et al. (2005) found that the association between 
personal protective equipment and assault disappeared 
when the equipment was provided by employers (rather 
than employee owned), and therefore this association 
cannot be attributed to the protective equipment alone.
While the searches conducted for this review focused 
on intervention based studies, none of the studies intro-
duced the use of personal alarms as an intervention. The 
studies found do not deal with the temporal order of a 
personal alarm intervention and outcome measures and 
therefore cannot provide evidence of causality. The stud-
ies additionally were not conducted in a controlled way 
and lack appropriate comparison groups. These stud-
ies provide some useful insight into factors that could 
be further investigated but do not provide evidence 
to inform us on the effectiveness of personal alarms 
to reduce assaults against healthcare staff. Studies are 
at best suggestive but do not allow us to conclude any-
thing with regard to effect and causation; they raise only 
possibilities.
Mechanism
Personal security alarms may send a deterrent message to 
potential offenders, while also improving staff confidence 
and decreasing fear. A report from the National Institute 
for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) (2006) suggested 
that personal security and fixed alarms along with com-
munication devices are a useful way of preventing violent 
behaviour and protecting staff where it occurs, but no 
research relevant to this was identified through searches 
undertaken as part of this review.
The use of a passive (unmonitored) audible alarm is 
primarily intended to disarm and disorientate an offender 
giving the victim time to get away. To be effective it is 
suggested that the noise emitted needs to be greater 
than 130 dB (ideally around 138 dB) and sounds continu-
ously, to avoid similarity to other more frequently heard 
car alarms (Personal Alarms 2016), although no research 
studies supporting this contention in healthcare settings 
were uncovered in the course of this review.
Personal safety alarms are often designed to be dis-
creet and hidden either to enable the user to create a 
moment of surprise or disorientation in the potential 
attacker to allow time to get away, or to call covertly 
for physical assistance to de-escalate a situation. While 
it has been reported that audible alarms should not be 
used in indoor or enclosed environments due to the risk 
of escalating a potentially violent situation, there is no 
evidence to establish whether triggering of a silent (cov-
ert) or audible personal alarm (overt) can have any sub-
sequent effect on the outcome in terms of occurrence or 
severity of an assault. Evidence from available studies did 
not allow us to elicit any findings on whether a situation 
is more likely to be de-escalated or escalated in particu-
lar settings as a result of an alarm being triggered overtly 
or covertly.
Research conducted into the costs and benefits of mon-
itored quick-response pendant alarms (linked to police 
control rooms) to reduce repeat victimization for domes-
tic violence has highlighted a number of preventative 
mechanisms that may be activated from their use (Farrell 
et  al. 1993). While recommendations around the use of 
personal alarms in domestic violence situations may have 
changed, these mechanisms describing how personal 
alarms may work could also apply to their use in other 
contexts, and are described as:
1. Direct incapacitation—response to alarm activation 
prevents assault;
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2. Indirect incapacitation—alarm activation leads to 
arrest of offender preventing further assaults during 
detention;
3. Specific deterrence—potential offenders are aware of 
personal alarm and as a result do not offend;
4. General deterrence—potential offenders aware of a 
scheme to equip staff with personal security alarms 
and therefore avoid offending as a result (Farrell et al. 
1993).
In terms of the four studies identified in this review, 
only Landau and Bendalak (2008) suggested a mecha-
nism to explain how personal alarms might act to reduce 
assaults. The authors developed hypotheses to test the 
likelihood of victimisation against 15 independent vari-
ables based on routine activity theory. The authors’ 
third hypothesis on guarding, suggested that the likeli-
hood of an individual being victimized will be reduced if 
they are exposed to greater levels of guardianship as this 
decreases opportunities for victimization. The authors 
specifically identified the access to an emergency button 
as a protective device that serves to increase guardian-
ship. In their specific setting (emergency department 
wards in Israel) they found a near statistically significant 
association between the lack of access to an emergency 
button and an increased likelihood of being victimized. 
While this study does not provide a rigorous test for the 
suggested mechanism, and does not control for other fac-
tors, the authors do highlight that it demonstrates the 
importance of environmental and situational factors in 
applying interventions to reduce assaults as implied by 
routine activity theory.
Moderators
Reported variations in rates of assaults in different 
healthcare settings suggest there may be different pro-
cesses and pathways in terms of violence and therefore 
potentially different requirements for violence preven-
tion in different settings. Gerberich et al. (2005) and Far-
rell et al. (2014) both reported higher rates of assault in 
elderly care, psychiatric and emergency department 
settings. NHS Protect note similar variations in rates 
of assaults across different sectors, with figures for 
2015/2016 reporting assault rates per 1000 staff to be 21 
for the acute sector, 54 for the ambulance sector and 191 
for the mental health sector (NHS Protect 2017a). The 
healthcare setting (e.g. whether community, ambulance, 
acute, secure wards, in patient or emergency) and patient 
population (e.g. geriatric, adult, paediatric or mental 
health) have been shown to be strong moderating fac-
tors. If preventive intervention efforts are targeted across 
whole healthcare sectors, it seems likely that any effects 
will be diluted due to the differences between settings 
(e.g. community and ward settings) and it also seems 
likely that the ways in which alarms might work might 
differ. Different settings are therefore likely to require dif-
ferent alarm systems, and research is needed to identify 
those systems with the most potential for success.
A related critical condition for personal alarms to pre-
vent violence against healthcare staff may concern the 
source of the violence, in particular whether assaults are 
due to unintentional ‘medical reasons’ present at the time 
of the incident or whether they are criminally motivated. 
This was only alluded to in the highlighted studies, and 
is intrinsically linked to the healthcare setting and pri-
mary patient population. NHS Protect reported that 25% 
(17,851) of total reported assaults (70,555) in 2015–2016 
did not involve any medical factors (NHS Protect 2017a). 
The ambulance sector reported the highest proportion of 
assaults determined as having no medical factors at 75% 
with the victim wishing to report the incident to police 
in 50.7% of cases. This was very different in acute and 
mental health sectors where 26.7 and 21.9% of reported 
assaults respectively had no medical factors involved and 
with only 4.9 and 2.8% of assaults with victim wishing to 
report to police (Dixon 2010). It is reasonable to conjec-
ture that any preventive mechanisms of alarm systems 
will vary by the distribution of sources of violent behav-
iour, which might thereby be expected to moderate the 
outcomes produced.
Different types of alarms may be required to reduce 
assaults in these different scenarios. Personal audible 
alarms are unlikely to deter offenders from committing 
assaults when they are not in control of their actions, 
while they may be more effective in deterring offenders 
in a community setting who have no medical factors. 
In circumstances where medical factors contribute to 
assault, access to a personal or fixed alarm as a compo-
nent in a monitored system and which trigger immedi-
ate assistance may be able to prevent or reduce severity 
of assaults. There is a range of different types of personal 
alarms available as discussed previously in this review 
and these should be considered to ensure the most 
appropriate technology is implemented for each setting.
In addition to the different clinical settings having an 
impact on the potential for effectiveness of personal 
alarms, the studies highlight diverse other underlying 
factors that may be having a moderating impact at the 
same time. Farrell et  al. (2014), noted staffing shift pat-
terns and rotations (higher risk implied for those working 
nights and in rotating shift patterns), along with the 
standard of patient facilities and experience of nursing 
staff to be a factor in risk of assault. Gerberich et  al. 
(2005) similarly pointed to ambient lighting being as 
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bright as daylight as having a significant and positive 
effect on the risk of violence. Jason Pott1 (also see Appen-
dix 4) however, noted that depending on who manages 
the hospital (e.g. a private finance initiative) the Trust 
may not have control over such environmental factors. 
Where possible, such factors which may be moderators 
of the intervention, should also be considered when 
implementing a scheme.
Implementation
There is some overlap in the moderating factors and 
issues that should be considered in implementing a per-
sonal alarm intervention but there is little mention of 
the specifics required to implement such an intervention 
successfully, in the studies found. However, in discussion 
with Jason Pott (see Appendix 4), a Lead Research Nurse 
in a London emergency department, he clearly felt that 
the practical implementation of any intervention would 
require careful consideration:
“The Emergency Department is a complex and 
stressed environment where patients are not in con-
trol and are ‘at the mercy of staff ’. [Waiting] time is a 
major factor, in addition to intoxication and pain… 
there are a number of flash points which can trigger 
aggression… Any intervention has to be considered 
to terms of its practical application within the ED.”
In arguing that the particular attributes of emergency 
departments need to be considered in implementing an 
alarm scheme if it is to be effective, Pott is suggesting 
that these attributes will be important in shaping how 
any given alarm system will work through in practice to 
produce its consequences. In other words, the emergency 
department context (and by extension the particular 
attributes of any other healthcare setting) are important 
as implementation factors because they function as mod-
erators, conditioning any effects brought about by an 
alarm system.
A further factor mentioned by Pott but not explicitly 
considered in any of the highlighted studies, includes the 
use of publicity in deterrence and how this may impact a 
personal alarm intervention (whether or not if the public 
and potential offenders are aware of the use alarms this 
would increase deterrence). Indeed, there is extensive 
literature on the use of publicity to increase deterrence, 
and it has been shown to increase the success of crime 
reduction interventions (Laycock 1991; Bowers and 
Johnson 2003, 2005). Publicity may therefore comprise a 
1 Involvement of NHS staff was an important part of the development of 
this review. Jason Pott, a Lead Research Nurse in the Emergency Depart-
ment of the Royal London Hospital, was approached for advice during 
development of this review as NHS staff involvement was considered 
important.
key condition for alarms to maximise their potential pre-
ventive outcome.
However, Jason Pott noted that in his experience in the 
NHS, implementation of policies or interventions with 
good publicity does not always translate well into prac-
tice on the ground (e.g. the zero tolerance of aggression 
in the NHS).
“[zero tolerance] Policies are only partially imple-
mented (i.e. physical aggression, but not verbal 
aggression). The zero tolerance message does not 
seem to be delivered on the ‘shop floor’; it seems to be 
a ‘headline’ policy and doesn’t deter those individu-
als who are most likely to offend against NHS staff. 
There is also poor implementation and support for 
the policy…”
So, publicity may be a key contextual condition for 
alarms to produce violence-reducing outcomes but the 
practical implementation of publicity is evidently partial 
and it clearly cannot have its possible moderating influ-
ence if not put in place.
Pott’s personal experience of implementation of per-
sonal alarms in an emergency department was also that 
they are often in practice patchily operated. For example 
he notes that alarms were often misplaced, not handed 
over at shift changes and were not effectively deployed. 
Here, the system might be effective if operated as 
intended but cannot be if in practice, it is not used. Mon-
itored fixed alarms including locational information on 
activation might provide the best opportunity to diffuse a 
potentially assaultive situation.
The zero tolerance policy to aggression in the NHS has 
been highly publicised in order to act as a deterrent to 
offenders by increasing the perceived risk of apprehen-
sion. Publicising the implementation of alarms could do 
the same, although with publicity there is also the poten-
tial to increase the fear of crime or violence. A strategic 
approach e.g. to specifically publicise the success of an 
intervention is more likely to reassure the public while at 
the same time increase the perceived risk of apprehen-
sion to offenders (Bowers and Johnson 2005). Careful 
implementation of an alarm intervention that considers 
the setting, engages the commitment of staff and man-
agement to apply it in practice, and includes appropri-
ate policy and publicity to support it, could increase the 
deterrence effect.
Economics
There was no mention of costs in the four studies high-
lighted in this review. The costs of violence to the NHS, 
have been noted previously in this review as being 
£69 million per annum for physical and non-physical vio-
lence and aggression (National Audit Office 2003), with 
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the cost of physical assaults during 2007–2008 being 
estimated at £60  million (NHS Security Management 
Service 2007). There are significant impacts for the NHS 
of violence against staff, which were mentioned previ-
ously. These include, pain, time away from work, depres-
sion and low self-esteem, which in turn will mean loss of 
NHS personnel for significant periods of time, high staff 
turnover and resignations. Violence against staff repre-
sents substantial costs to the NHS and should therefore 
justify appropriate levels of investment in order to reduce 
its occurrence.
Research needs in the future
The risks of assault from patients in particular, but also 
from their family and friends, are high and costly in some 
health care settings. It is therefore important the deci-
sion-makers have informed guidance on cost-effective 
preventive strategies.
A range of measures can be and have been used to 
try to reduce the problem, of which alarms form a 
part. Alarm systems themselves differ widely from one 
another. Such alarm systems work in different ways and, 
as found where alarms are used as a preventive measure 
for other crime problems, they often depend on the avail-
ability and inclination of others to respond and take fur-
ther action and those inclinations to respond are apt to 
change over time. Given the diversity of contexts where 
health staff are at risk, the variations in alarm system, and 
the varying range of other preventive measures in place 
alongside alarms it would have made little sense to aggre-
gate findings from field trials. There is too much hetero-
geneity and complexity.
Prior to undertaking further primary studies, a useful 
starting point for future research would be to undertake 
wider consultation with healthcare staff, as well as pro-
fessionals from the security industry and organisations 
specialising in personal safety training, consultancy and 
conflict management, to assess a cross-section of issues 
that may affect the implementation of any personal alarm 
intervention and ascertain the conditions believed neces-
sary for them to produce their intended outcomes. Fol-
lowing this, rather than moving straight to field trials to 
meet the obvious evidence gap, it might be prudent first 
to undertake a series of EMMIE informed efficacy tri-
als. Efficacy trials are designed to test theory by creat-
ing conditions in which measures conjectured to have 
the potential to bring about their intended effects have 
their best chance of doing so (Loudon et al. 2015; God-
win et al. 2003). In contrast field trials aim to find out if 
the measures are effective in practice in real everyday 
conditions. EMMIE informed efficacy trials would expli-
cate the underlying theory of how alarms could produce 
reductions in assaults in the varying conditions present 
in the different types of settings in which healthcare staff 
members are at high risk of assault.
The underlying theory would specify the preventive 
mechanisms that alarms could activate, and the type of 
alarm system and complementary conditions that would 
be needed if the preventive mechanisms were to be acti-
vated. In particular, trials to address the different catego-
ries and mechanisms of alarms (audible or silent), and 
their intended outcome (to reduce the severity of assaults 
or deterrence) should be considered. Experimenters 
would then work closely with those managing and work-
ing within the trial sites to operationalize the system in 
the theoretically specified ways. They would track both 
the capital and maintenance costs involved in the system, 
note implementation hurdles encountered and how they 
were overcome, and focus on the details of the expected 
short and long-term changes in levels of assault in experi-
mental as against matched comparison sites. Long-term 
tracking is advocated given the possibility that staff and 
patient turnover and adaptation to the alarm system may 
change the way in which the alarm system operates over 
time.
Assuming that the trial produced promising findings, 
subsequent trials could then relax the artificial conditions 
imposed by the efficacy trial to try to discern whether and 
how alarms might be applied cost-effectively in packages 
of measures to reduce violence in healthcare settings.
Conclusion
There is a clear and urgent need for preventative meas-
ures to reduce violence experienced by NHS personnel. 
There is evidence of substantial variations in risk across 
different healthcare sectors, primary patient popula-
tions and clinical conditions. The literature discusses a 
wide range of preventative measures aimed at reducing 
assaults. There are also diverse types of alarm system 
available to address the problem. Additionally, different 
assault reduction interventions, including alarms, may 
interact with one another. In this complex and diverse 
field, decision makers need to be able to make informed 
choices to select measures that will work cost-effectively 
in their setting. So far, however, little research or evi-
dence has emerged to estimate their effectiveness, or to 
address the different ways in which different systems may 
be effective in varying settings.
There is a strong need to build a knowledge base that 
is fit for purpose and therefore in the short term, the 
authors suggest EMMIE-focused efficacy trials to try to 
gauge the potential preventive benefits from alarms as 
a prelude to future field trials. Further, if the findings of 
the efficacy trials are positive, to ascertain whether their 
routine deployment in high-risk settings could be recom-
mended as a cost-effective option.
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Appendix 1: Search strategy
Ovid MEDLINE(R), Ovid MEDLINE(R) In-Process & 
Other Non-Indexed Citations, Ovid MEDLINE(R) Daily 
and Ovid OLDMEDLINE(R)
 1. Aggression/
 2. violence/or workplace violence/
 3. Verbal abuse.mp.
 4. Physical abuse.mp.
 5. Dangerous Behavior/
 6. anger/or frustration/or hostility/
 7. (language adj3 (menacing or discrimin* or insult* or 
abuse or threat*)).ab,ti.
 8. (workplace adj3 (disturb* or violence)).ab,ti.
 9. (violen* or aggress* or hostil* or fight* or abuse* or 
accident* or assault*).ab,ti.
 10. ((physical or verbal) adj3 (attack* or threat* or abuse* 
or violence or aggression or insult*)).ab,ti.
 11. 1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 6 or 7 or 8 or 9 or 10
 12. ((personal or fixed or portable or emergency) adj3 
(alarm* or device*)).ti,ab.
 13. ((staff or employee*) adj3 (safe* or protect* or 
secur*)).ti,ab.
 14. risk management/or safety management/ or security 
measures/
 15. Rape/pc [Prevention & Control]
 16. Sex Offenses/pc [Prevention & Control]
 17. ((panic or alarm or help or SOS) adj3 (bell* or but-
ton*)).ti,ab.
 18. ((warning or security or alert*) adj3 device*).ti,ab.
 19. 12 or 13 or 14 or 15 or 16 or 17 or 18
 20. 11 and 19.
Notes:
[mp.=title, abstract, original title, name of substance 
word, subject heading word, keyword heading word, pro-
tocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supple-
mentary concept word, unique identifier].
Appendix 2: Standardised data extraction
Text was coded from included studies under the follow-
ing data extraction categories:
Study design
• Meta-analysis;
•  RCT;
•  Controlled interrupted time series;
•  Controlled before and after;
•  Before/after not controlled;
•  Cross sectional;
•  Case study;
•  Qualitative;
•  Commentary.
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Study length
• Dates of before period;
•  Dates of after period.
Study setting
• Country;
•  Healthcare setting (e.g. community based, emer-
gency or inpatient hospital department);
•  Other.
Study aims
Effect
Methods
Participants
Intervention (e.g. fixed alarm, personal alarm)
Comparator/control
Outcome measures
Quality of evidence. To include description and treat-
ment of bias and confounding
• Matching of intervention and control areas (e.g. the 
comparability of the settings; whether controls are 
likely to be affected by the intervention);
•  Blinding of data collection and analyses;
•  Lengths of data collection time period pre- and 
post-intervention;
•  Control of confounders (e.g. was there an assess-
ment of the distribution of confounders between 
intervention and control groups?);
•  Adjustment for time trends;
•  Any other potential sources of bias (regression to 
the mean);
•  Selective reporting of results by study authors.
Results—where in full text and quantitative results
• Difference between groups (include CI);
•  Interpretation.
Mechanism
Were any of these mechanisms mentioned?
  • Increasing risk;
  • Reducing reward;
  • Removing excuses;
  • Increasing effort;
  • Other;
  • Specific deterrence;
  • General deterrence.
Were any mentioned mechanisms tested?
Were any intermediate outcome measures taken to 
assess the activation of the causal mechanism(s) judged 
to underpin the intervention?
Moderators
Country of implementation
Setting of intervention (e.g. hospital ED, inpatient 
department, community setting)
Setting characteristics
Was the intervention implemented in isolation? 
(Standalone/package/unclear)
What type of technology was used?
Implementation (what is needed to implement the use 
of intervention)
Implementation factors mentioned
Implementation factors stated to be necessary for 
success
Who is responsible for deciding eligibility/location of 
intervention sites?
Who is responsible for setting up, operating and main-
taining the intervention?
Obstacles to implementation
Resources required
Any personnel requirements (training, monitoring of 
system).
Economics
Cost of programme set up
Annual running costs
Cost of a personal alarm
Cost of assaults prevented
Cost of personnel/hours
Direct and indirect benefits
Benefit cost ratio/cost benefit analysis.
Appendix 3: Characteristics of studies
Gale, 2002 (New Zealand)
Methods Cross sectional survey questioning 
provision of preventative meas-
ures and reported violence
Participants Managers of the 219 psychiatric 
units in New Zealand
Interventions No intervention
Outcomes Reported incidents over the last year 
of: property damage, attempted 
assault, physical attack, sexual 
harassment and stalking over last 
12 months
Notes The use of pocket alarms and panic 
buttons were surveyed, and ana-
lysed (Mann–Whitney U test) to 
look for associations with reported 
outcomes
Page 17 of 19Perkins et al. Crime Sci  (2017) 6:11 
Gerberich, 2005 (USA)
Methods Survey with nested case–control 
study, multiple logistic regression 
to explore risk factors (environ-
mental and personal protection 
factors) for physical violence
Participants 6300 Minnesota nurses (selected 
randomly from licensing 
database), nested case control 
included full questionnaires from 
310 cases and 946 control subjects
Interventions No intervention
Outcomes Self-reported cases of assault in the 
previous 12 months
Notes Survey included question on the 
use of mobile telephones and 
personal alarms (either their own 
or provided by employer) and 
occupational violence experience
Farrell, 2014 (Australia)
Methods Cross sectional survey. Binary logistic 
regression analysis to determine 
how protective factors were 
associated with occurrence of PVA 
(patient and visitor assault)
Participants Random sample of nurses and 
midwives registered with Nurses 
Board of Victoria
Interventions No intervention
Outcomes Prevalence of PVA from self reported 
assaults, over four most recent 
working weeks
PVA defined as “any incident where 
an employee is abused, threat-
ened or assaulted in circum-
stances arising out of, or in the 
course of their employment, 
where. . .a person to believe that 
they are in danger of being physi-
cally attacked, and may involve an 
actual or implied threat to safety, 
health or wellbeing. . . . Neither 
intent nor ability to carry out the 
treat is relevant; the key issue is 
that the behaviour creates a risk to 
health and safety”
Notes Participants responded giving their 
experiences of PVA over their four 
most recent working weeks also 
provided information on ‘protec-
tive factors’ including personal 
protective equipment (e.g. per-
sonal duress alarms)
Landau, 2008 (Israel)
Methods Cross sectional survey with multi-
variate regression to determine 
contribution of various factors to 
explanation of violence against 
emergency ward personnel
Participants 3000 questionnaires distributed to 
all types of staff in emergency 
wards of all 25 general hospitals 
in Israel
Interventions No intervention
Outcomes Self reported violent incidents dur-
ing the course of their work, in the 
previous year—used to generate 
a GEVI (General Index of Exposure 
to Violence)
Notes Multivariate regression used to 
determine contribution of various 
factors (professional character-
istics, personal characteristics, 
hospital structure including avail-
ability of an emergency button) to 
violence (GEVI)
Appendix 4: Stakeholder interview
Involvement of NHS staff was an important part of the 
development of this review. Jason Pott, Lead Research 
Nurse in the Emergency Department of the Royal Lon-
don Hospital, provided advice during its development. 
He was selected as a known contact with expertise and 
experience in the NHS. He told us that violence against 
staff is multifaceted and he believes a broad approach 
would be most effective in prevention.
“The Emergency Department is a complex and 
stressed environment where patients are not in con-
trol and are ‘at the mercy of staff ’. [Waiting] time is a 
major factor, in addition to intoxication and pain… 
there are a number of flash points which can trigger 
aggression… Any intervention has to be considered 
to terms of its practical application within the ED.”
Jason estimates that physical assaults on staff occur 
weekly in the ED at Royal London and verbal assaults 
occur daily. There is a pervasive culture that this is the 
accepted norm and particularly in ED, while tolerance 
may be lower in inpatient and outpatient settings. It is a 
uniquely high stress/risk environment (the Royal Lon-
don ED has 14–16 nurses for 450 patients per day, and 
up to 50 patients in the department at one time). Factors 
making assaults likely include high emotions and anxiety 
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(for patients or relatives) and aggressive language is com-
monly used and accepted.
“The system that is implemented needs to be whole 
system…there needs to be agreement from all stake-
holders on how all parties will uphold an approach. 
Inconsistency weakens all the members of the team 
and prevents the public from seeing the zero toler-
ance approach. Red-carding from A&E is almost 
unheard of, and those who are removed are rarely 
physically violent, but are chronic patients with 
complex needs which is more concerning.”
Jason commented on the range of interventions that 
have been proposed to reduce violence against NHS staff.
Environmental factors
CCTV this is widely implemented and has its usefulness 
but requires monitoring and is often under resourced. 
There would be resistance from nursing staff to have 
these and they could not be used in cubicles where risk is 
highest, to protect patient privacy.
Fixed emergency alarms in the past, personal security 
alarms have been issued to ED staff at the Royal London, 
but these were often forgotten, misplaced, and handover 
after each shift was inefficient. Fixed call alarms in cubi-
cles might be a better solution (current ‘arrest’ alarms do 
not provide location information).
Security guards are well utilised in the Royal London 
ED. They are effective and engage well with staff but are 
anxious about clinical issues and their role in restraint 
of patients. This makes them cautious when considering 
removing patients. Security staff are only able really to 
act under instruction of the clinical staff which requires 
resources to manage.
Police officers police presence in the ED was an effective 
policy but cannot be resourced. Some clinical staff feel 
poorly supported by the police in real situations.
Building access most EDs have worked hard to lock 
down departments and the new emergency department 
at Royal London has restricted access doors. This is an 
ongoing struggle and is impossible to police because 
patients often arrive with other people and this needs to 
be tolerated.
Ambient environments, lighting and calming décor décor 
is challenging and if hospitals are managed through a PFI 
then the Trust does not have control of the decoration. 
Lighting is always well lit, possibly aggressively so.
Practices and policies
NHS Security Incident Reporting System (SIRS) is an elec-
tronic tool to report security incidents on the premises to 
NHS Protect, to aid in detecting and preventing crime in 
a national, regional and sector specific context.
Jason told us there is a strong feeling that violence and 
aggression in Emergency Departments remains under-
reported. Verbal aggression is almost never reported to 
the police; and where reported there is often a resistance 
to arrest anyone, or at least there is inconsistent treat-
ment of offenders. There have been accounts of police 
reluctance to take patients who may have mental/physi-
cal health issues. There is also some reluctance from ED 
staff to report anything but the most serious cases to the 
police, due to the resources required to report and give 
statements (i.e. to maintain patient care in a busy ward 
they cannot afford staff to be away from patients for 
40 min to report an incident). Incidents may be reported 
but are often not escalated to the police. Reporting needs 
to be supported at different managerial levels, allowing 
for whether a patient’s ill health is a contributory factor.
‘Zero tolerance’ policies policies are only partially imple-
mented (i.e. physical aggression, but not verbal aggres-
sion). The zero tolerance message does not seem to be 
delivered on the ‘shop floor’; it seems to be a ‘headline’ 
policy and doesn’t deter those individuals who are most 
likely to offend against NHS staff. There is also poor 
implementation and support for the policy: the core 
‘quality’ indicators, upon which EDs are judged, include 
things such as admission/discharge times, times for tri-
age from ambulance, patient satisfaction; while violence 
against staff is not included.
Staff skills
The NHS provides compulsory 1  day Conflict Resolu-
tion training to all front-line staff. The training includes 
components of self-defence, personal awareness, conflict 
avoidance techniques, ‘proportional force’ and reinforce-
ment that staff should not expect to be hit. It costs around 
£250 to send a nurse on the 1 day course. In addition all 
ED staff have ‘de-escalation’ and breakaway training.
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